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VILLA'S COLUMBUS RAID:
PRACTICAL POLITICS OR GERMAN DESIGN?

FRANCIS

J.

MUNCH

the Columbus Raid and Francisco Villa have been
popularized by journalistic, entertaining myths; there has been little attempt to procure evidence for the reasons for the Raid. Historians of the Wilson era have concentrated chiefly on the war with
Germany and the issues of domestic reform, on neutrality and the
submarine thesis..
The real significance of the Columbus Raid is related to the role
of the Mexican Revolution within the larger world-wide conflagration. Did the American intervention in Mexico in 1916-1917
trigger German unreStricted submarine warfare. and, ironically,
American intervention in Europe? Was the decision for unrestricted
submarine warfare influenced by prior. American and Mexican
maneuvers? Was there a connection among the Columbus Raid,
Pershing's Expedition, and the new unrestricted German submarine policy?
Was American, Mexican, or German participation responsible
for the Columbus Raid? The evidence suggests that Villa's raid on
Columbus, New Mexico; combined Mexican-American provocations with a Mexican~German conspiracy.
.
ALTHOUGH

MEXICAN-AMERICAN PROVOCATIONS

ON March 9, 191 6,Frailcisco Villa crossed the international border and raided the sleeping American town of Columbus, New
Mexico. 1 Many motives have been suggested for a seemingly irra-
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tional provocation against the United States, but sifting of the evidence shows that the assault on Columbus was a natural result of
previous events-arising from both United States foreign policy
and conditions within the Mexican border states of Sonora and
Chihuahua. 2
Early in 1915 the United States looked on Villa with favor as a
possible-even probable-savior of Mexico. Venustiano Carranza,
on the other hand, had taken a definite anti-American attitude, especially in reference to United States business interests within
Mexico. Villa was consistently friendly toward Americans and cooperative with the United States until October 1915.3 The beginning of 19 I 5 saw Villa as the outstanding soldier of the Mexican
Revolution. Then his good fortune vanished and reverses at Celaya
and Leon started him on the long downgrade to final defeat. 4 Villa
was quickly reduced from a national power to a regional chieftain;
then squeezed into Chihuahua, and on into the Sierra Madre Occidental by Alvaro Obregon and American border policies. 5
Despite considerable popular support in Chihuahua, Villa
needed the favor of the United States. Before the recognition of
Carranza he requested a closed border; he demanded an open border afterwards. Woodrow Wilson gave him neither. Successful
revolutionaries had always depended on favorable United States
border conditions. The worst possible situation was to be constricted within a small, semi-arid, frontier area near a tightly closed
international border. By October 1915, Villa was rapidly approaching this state of affairs.
The United States formally recognized the Carranza regime as
the de facto government of Mexico on October 19, 1915. In the
future the United States would be distinctly more partial toward
Carranza than it had ever been toward Villa. This was evident on
the very day of recognition, when an embargo was placed on arms
and munitions for Villa, while the export of munitions consigned to
the de facto government was permitted. 6 As a result of the embargo
smuggling increased; this)n turn intensified border tension. 7
Although Villa had been informed of the probability that the
United States would recognize Carranza, the news did not reach
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him until he was approaching Agua Prieta, Sonora. GeorgeC. Carothers, State Department Special Agent with Villa, and Colonel
Herbert Slocum, 13th Cavalry, both reported that Villa became
very angry and declared that he would have no further dealings
with the United States. 8 The recognition of Carranza changed
Villa into an open enemy of the United States. It was Wilson's first
overt maneuver against the bandit of Chihuahua.
Several weeks later President Wilson approved a request from
the de facto government to reinforce Agua Prieta, Sonora, via the
United States. 9 Five thousand Carranzista troops were transported
from Piedras Negras, Coahuila, over the Southern Pacific Railroa9
through Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, to defeat Villa in
Sonora. 1O Not only trainloads of soldiers but also artillery, munitions, and equipment poured through Douglas, Arizona, into Mexico. General Plutarco Elias Calles surrounded Agua Prieta on three
sides with deep entrenchments, aprons of barbed wire, and machine guns emplaced to sweep all approaches. By intensive labor
and with the privilege of shipping munitions and materiel through
the United States, the defenders were able to make Agua Prieta almost impregnable before Villa appeared in the mountain passes to
the east. n
Weapons and Carranzista entrenchments were not the only tactical features of the battlefield that contributed to Villa's defeat.
The battlefield was illuminated. Previously Villa had had great
success in night attacks, but at Agua Prieta powerful searchlights
turned night into day. They not only revealed the oncoming attack
but blinded the attackers. These searchlights caused much bitterness among the Villistas and quickly added to the grudge building
against the United States. As it became apparent during the next
few days that their defeat was helped, if not entirely caused, by the
new policies of the United States, rumors began to circulate among
the Villistas that the searchlights had been furnished by the United
States Army and manned by American soldiers. 12
.
Villa was very angry and declared "that he was through with any
dealings with the United States."13 Before Agua Prieta, from the
outbreak of the Revolution, the United States had been careful not
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to give any official material aid to any faction. Armed Mexican
forces were never permitted on American soil, even during the
period when the United States was openly hostile to Victoriano
Huerta and favorable to the Constitutionalists. Later, after the
Columbus Raid, two wallets containing official records were captured. In a letter to Emiliano Zapata, Villa denounced the permission granted Carranza to transport troops through American
territory.14 After Agua Prieta, Villa announced that he intended
to seize all horses and saddle equipment regardless of ownership.
Moreover, he demanded a forced loan of twenty-five thousand dollars from each of four American companies in his territory and
threatened to confiscate all the cattle of the Cananea Cattle Company.15
Another cause of Villista extortion was the decline in his finances. In early October the purchaSing power of Villa money had
dropped almost to zero. 16 By November the exchange rate of his
money was two hundred fifty to one. 17 In December it was no
longer in circulation. IS Villa's garrisons, especially in Ciudad
Juarez, complained that they were paid with worthless notes, and
this created the possibility of mass defections. 19 As Villistas became
increasingly hard pressed for bare essentials they became more desperate in their acquisition of them. 20
Villa became a forager and a looter~a bandit-after his defeat at
Agua Prieta. In Sonora, Villa "absolutely cleaned out all available
food." Reports from Cananea, Imuris, Magdalena, and SantaCruz
state that "all stores have been looted" and even private dwellings
were "cleaned out of everything of value" and "the whole country
denuded of everything edible or of any value." On the way back
from Sonora, Villa personally directed looting in La Colorada and
San Pedro. All stores were cleaned out and all livestock and wagons
were taken. This banditry continued in Chihuahua during 1916,
and the looting was so complete that "not a grain of corn nor article
of clothing" was left behind. 21
Since December 1915 Villa had been squeezed into the northwestern part of Chihuahua. Consequently, his Villistas broke up
into many small bands which roamed in every direction and dev-
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astated transportation and food supplies. This not only reduced
Villa's control as military chief but also increased anti-American
provocations. While looting, Villistas claimed that Villa had given
orders to kill every gringo. 22 In his attempts to better his shakyfinances, Villa also engaged in smuggling. He traded surreptitiously
through Mexican cattle dealers, especially the Terrazas family.
United States Customs officials estimated that during November
1915 Villa collected $500,000 gold in export taxes on cattle and
sheep from the Terrazas interests. In December he was still receiving arms, ammunition, and coal as well as bringing the last of the
Terrazas cattle into El Paso for sale. 23
Villa's defeat at Hermosillo was the key determinant of his new
occupation as guerrilla and his desperate raids in Sonora and Chihuahua. Here Villa suffered losses that completely destroyed the
morale of his army. The attack on Agua Prieta resulted in defeat;
the attack on Hermosillo was a disaster. By the end of November
1915 Villa was finished as a major factor in Mexican politics. The
remnants of Villa's army, drifting northward toward Nogales, committed all the atrocities which seem to be inseparable from a breakdown of army discipline.
Hermosillo further hardened Villa's attitude toward the United
States. The Villistas were certain that they would have been victorious at Agua Prieta if the garrison had not been reinforced
through the United States, and their defeat at l-Iermosillo would
not have occurred. 24 On November 25, 19i5' two Villista colonels
shouted insults at United States Consul Frederick Simpich near
the Nogales Customhouse. The uproar attracted a large group of
mounted Villistas who threatened Simpich with their drawn guns.
Several· of them rode across the boundary waving their pistols. 25
Later, at three different times, Villistas opened fire from the Mexican side. 26 Carlos Randall, the Villista governor of Sonora, excused
the disorder on the grounds that it was caused by the prohibition
on exporting food from the United States. 27
The most important result of the Sonoran debacle was the destruction and disorganization of the Division del Norte. After Villa
struggled back over the Sierra Madre in December, he arrived in
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Chihuahua to find some of his generals in disagreement with him. 28
After Hermosillo, Pancho Villa did not have an army, and he was
not in command of its disorganized remnants. Even before American recognition of Carranza in October, there had been indications
that Villa did not have complete control over his followers. Most of
Villa's representatives replied for themselves, without consulting
their leader. Every one of Carranza's lieutenants referred matters to
their First Chief. 29
The massacre at Santa Ysabel on January 10, 1916, was a result
of Hermosillo. A semi-autonomous Villista band, led by Colonel
Pablo Lopez, stopped a Mexican Northwestern train and systematically robbed, then shot, seventeen American mining engineers on
their way to reopen the American-owned La Cusi Mining Company.3Q These Villista bands were practically independent. Lopez
was bitterly anti-American. 31 According to an eyewitness account
by Jose Maria Sanchez, a Mexican employee of the La Cusi Mining Company:
They riHed our pockets, took our blankets and even our lunches,
then Col. Pablo Lopez, in charge of the looting of our car, said: "If
you want to see some fun, watch us kill these gringos. Come on boys,"
he shouted to his followers. They ran from the coach, crying "Viva
Villa!" and "Death to the gringos!" I heard a volley of riHe shots, and
looked out the window.
All bodies were completely stript of clothing and shoes. 32

Though the bandits at Santa Ysabel were Villistas, the degree to
which Francisco Villa was personally involved has never been determined. Pablo Lopez was captured by the Carranzistas in April
and promptly executed. After his death, the Carranzista governor
of Chihuahua, Don Ignacio Enriquez, quoted Lopez as having
said: "Villa ordered me to commit the Santa Ysabel massacre. Villa
was behind a hill near the scene."33 Clendenen says that it is only
fair to state that Villa denied this vehemently. Villa admitted ordering the seizure of the,payroll, but not having given any orders to
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molest the Americans.34 In any case, the act was perpetrated by men
who, nominally at least, acknowledged his authority. They shouted,
"Viva Villa!" while the murders were being committed. Clendenen
concludes that "Villa's ultimate, and legal, responsibility is beyond
question."35
Another reason for Villa's increasingly desperate situation in
Chihuahua and for his intensified frustration was the constant
diminution of his forces. Such support was not only a military but
a psychological necessity for Francisco Villa. The chieftain Villato exist-had to command. Americans had scuttled him by recognizing Carranza in October. As a result, Mexicans had been Reeing
the Villa standard. Already in October, reports had indicated that
Villa's forces were disintegrating and deserting to Carranza. In
November the number of bands which deserted to Carranza without battle, but with the promise of amnesty, increased. 36 During
December a virtual Rood of defections took place, including Ciudad
Juarez, vital to Villa's smuggling operations. Here Villista General
Tomas Ornelas, together with the Secretary of State for Chihuahua, Sylvestre Terrazas, surrendered the town and garrison to General Obregon. 37 The former Villistas were immediately paid and
mustered out. Many did not return to their homes but re-enlisted
with the Carranza forces. Villista troops continued to defect in
small groups during January 1916, principally at Chihuahua City,
Casas Grandes, and Palomas. 3s
The seriousness of these defections was reRected in German
foreign policy as well as in Villa's personal reactions. Germany
recognized the Carranza government,39 Faced with the task of regaining not only his lost military power, but his own personal prestige, Francisco Villa had to prove to the world that he was still a
force to be respected. 40 Moreover, Villa's desperate position, exacerbated by the moves of Customs Officer Zachary Cobb, forced the
Chihuahuan guerrilla to consider practical measures to regain his
lost power. But if Villa was already desperate, Carranza's position in
early 19 I 6 was beginning to decline, especially in Chihuahua. The
First Chief was not in· control, and his financial and military hold
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was decidedly weak. Villa knew Carranza's strength in Chihuahua
and tapped telegraph wires for additional information concerning
American reaction to the seemingly impotent First Chief. 41
As early as December 1915 American government officials noted
the political difficulties in Chihuahua. The State had "sometimes
gone for [Pascual] Orozco, sometimes for Villa, but never outright
for Carranza."42 In early January 1916 Carranza was expropriating
American property in Durango to sustain his military forces. Nevertheless he was unable to establish complete control.43 According to
American authorities, Carranza appeared to have lost the opportunity to improve conditions along the border. 44 By late January
19 I 6 there was definite lack of American confidence in the Carranza government's ability to establish order in Northern Mexico. Carranza money was worth four cents on the dollar, less than
Villa currency six months earlier. 45 Furthermore, not a single member of the Lopez band had been captured. 46
The Carranza government did not have enough troops to accomplish what was expected, and its resources were scanty. Emiliano Zapata was still in the field, and a large-scale campaign against
the Yaqui Indians was under way.47 The State Department, however, saw only the failure of the First Chief to control the political
and alleviate the economic situations. 48 The financial basis of the de
facto government was becoming even more unstable. By March
1916 Carranza money was worth only three cents on the dollar. 49
On the very day of the Columbus Raid, dispatches to the Secretary
of State claimed that the First Chief lacked the forces necessary to
disperse Villa. 50
In March 19 I 6 Villa could count on the fact that an American
intervention in Mexico had great prospects of shaking Carranza's
already weakened position. If Carranza did not oppose such an intervention, he would no longer be First Chief. If Carranza did
oppose an American intervention, he could well lose de facto
recognition and vital diplomatic support. Villa would have a chance
to recoup his losses. 51
While aware of these possibilities, Villa was primarily concerned
with the more immediate matter of survival, which was made in-
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creasingly difficult by Zachary Cobb and later by George C. Carothers. Cobb's unfavorable reports seemed to be inspired by personal hatred. In August 1915 Cobb opposed measures to reopen the
Juarez packing houses to enable Villa to raise funds without imposingtaxes or forced loans upon foreigners (and Terrazas cattle). He
fought the scheme on the grounds that the slaughtered cattle would
be stolen ani)nals. By October Cobb had become a one-man diplomatic and consular force whose driving concern was to bring about
Villa's complete and final downfall:
Cobb made it his immediate mission to cut off supplies for Villa
passing through £1 Paso, to prevent Villa's gaining any revenue by
exports through Juarez, and by these means to render Juarez untenable for the Villistagarrison. If he could accomplish this, Cobb would
succeed in closing Villa's last gateway to the outer world. 52

To achieve these ends, Cobb was determined that no coal should
cross from £1 Paso into Villa territory. He recommended that the
State Department obtain an injunction to prevent rolling stock of
the Mexican National Railways from returning to Mexico. The
Alvarado Mining Company, however, continued to operate in Mexico, thereby helping Villa by paying taxes. Cobb asked that the
anticipated complaint by the Company be ignored until Ciudad
Juarez was taken from Villa. 53 Shortly afterwards, Cobb informed
the State Department that he had ordered all cattle shipments held
on the Mexican side of the border pending surety that no Villa
export tax would be paid. He later recommended an embargo on
all cattle importations from Mexico. 54
George C. Carothers, Special Agent for the State Department,
then began to report on Villa's growing desperate situation. He suggested that the measures recommended by Cobb be applied at other
places. Coal and anything else that would benefit Villa should be
embargoed. 55 There is evidence that the Cobb-Carothers campaign
against Villa's finances and transportation achieved gradual success. Cobb even went so far as to find an American purchaser for
the coal destined for Villa. 56 In November the suspension of rail-
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road operations in Sonoran territory held by Villa, for lack of coal
from the United States, was a sore point with Villistas. A report from
the Navy Department strongly indicated that Villa was "unable to
secure supplies from the United States, and there are no supplies
in Sonora from which he can draw."57
El Paso, however, continued to be troublesome to Cobb. In
several reports he complained of the inability of the Treasury Department to enforce a complete embargo on arms and munitions. He
complained that munitions were stored in many places in El Paso,
and that such shipments were impossible to watch without an adequate number of customs officials. 58 Cobb's efforts were matched by
Villa's smuggling, sale of cattle, and gambling-house profits-all in
Ciudad Juarez-until the Villista garrison defected to Carranza in
December 191 5. 59
On March 9, 1916, Villa crossed the border to loot Columbus,
New Mexico. It is obvious that the raid was well planned. There
is no question that Villa was a man of keen intelligence. For several
days before the border crossing, Villa had laid plans for his foray as
well as for his retreat into Chihuahua. 60 Arriving near Palomas,
Mexico, he began slaughtering large numbers of cattle for provisions. 61 Prior to the raid, great gaps were cut in fences near the
border. 62 Villa also sent spies into Columbus to report on the possibilities of success without serious American miltary opposition.
While Villa's informers were in Columbus, he discussed possible
objectives with his staff. He had misgivings concerning the failure
of a surprise attack. When his spies returned and reported, Villa
"after a long wait" made his decision. 63 At approximately four A.M.,
his force of 485 men halted at an arroyo in the dark, five hundred
yards from the sleeping town. Mounted columns converged and
each column was assigned certain objectives. 64
The Mexicans followed a definite plan. They made simultaneous
attacks . . . into the town. . . . Their patent familiarity with the
terrain argues that the plan was based on accurate information and
had been made well in advance. 65
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An analysis of what actually happened at Columbus clearly
shows that Villa raided for loot, and this was the explanation given
by the United States 13th Cavalry stationed in the town. The
Army camp had exactly the supplies Villa needed: machine guns,
munitions, and many horses, hybrids of Arabian stock. 66 The town
contained all kinds of provisions, food, clothing, money, mainly
located in Sam and Louis Ravel's generill store. Villa had previously
carried on an extensive business with the Ravel brothers, purchasing large quantities of guns and ammunition. Thus, familiar with
the largest general store in Columbus, the Villistas concentrated
there for a thorough looting. 67 In the course of three hours, the
Villistas confined their attention chiefly to looting. They inflicted
only such casualties and destruction as would seem inevitable in
such a desperate robbery.6s Had Villa been thinking in terms of
in:Ricting casualties, Fort Bliss would have been his objective. Columbus was isolated, sparsely guarded-an ideal place for guerrilla
foraging. 69
The real situation of El Leon del Norte was this: He was constricted into a small, semi-arid, unproductive area bordered by the
United States. The border ports were Villa's only means of survival at this stage in his political-military career. He had to raid to
exist. Villa's retreat was unexpectedly hurried by Major Frank
Tompkins. For fifteen miles south of Columbus, the trail was littert::d with quantities of loot, along with two abandoned machine
guns. 70
In conclusion, the international provocation made by Francisco
Villa at Columbus, New Mexico, March 9, 1916, was motivated
primarily by physical necessity. As long as he was hemmed in and
alive, Villa would raid for survival-in Mexico or in the United
States. Raids into the United States, in fact, were commonplace
along the Texas border in 1915-1916.71 But Villa's raid on Columbus clearly showed his desperate condition.
The driving passion of the Villistas was their need-the unremitting
need of money, clothes, arms, ammunition, and, as the mainstay of
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their profession, horseflesh. Money and clothes from ricos like rich
Sam Ravel-and from the militares, arms, ammunition, and horses!72

In addition, there was the possibility of American interventiona possible double revenge on both the Wilson and Carranza governments. Carranza's fall could only mean Villa's rise. Villa had little
left to lose; there was much to gain, then and in the future.

MEXICAN-GERMAN PROVOCATIONS
FOR THE COLUMBUS RAID

A SIFTING of the evidence also indicates that Germany was partially
responsible for the assault on Columbus-owing to the intrigue by
Villa's agent in the United States, Felix Sommerfeld, with German
Secret Service agents. 73 By 1915 German policy toward the United
States was twofold: American arms and munitions must be diverted
from the Entente powers; the United States must not enter the
European War. Within the United States, the German Secret
Service, aided by the clumsy Franz Rintelen von Kleist, proved unable to stop the How of weapons. Emphasis was then placed on
Mexico as a potential trouble spot.
An American-Mexican war would not only interrupt the export
of weapons but keep the United States fully occupied at home. 74
With this aim, several conspiracies were entered into with various
Mexican officials, revolutionaries, and exile groups.75
The German reasoning was basically sound. The eventual entry of
the United States into World War I, even in the spring of 1915, was
.a strong possibility. A friendly government in Mexico could give Germany a base of operations in the Western Hemisphere and at the
same time would keep the government of Woodrow Wilson occupied
with matters closer to home. If United States arms and ammunition
could be diverted· aWay from· the Allies because of the threat of a
hostile government to the south this would constitute an added bene-

fit. 76

Carranzista troops at Agua Prieta.
International Film Service, Inc.
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Villa in the field (center, wearing white hat).
Aultman Collection. Courtesy SouthwestReference Dept., El Paso Public Library.

From left to right: George C. Carothers, 3 d from left, hands on raiiing;; Villa and Gen.. Hugh Scott, seated center;
.
Rodolfo Fierro, behind Scott; Felix Sommerfeld, standing with elbow on railing.
Aultman Collection. Courtesy Southwest, Reference Dept., El Paso Public Library.
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From left to right in foreground: Gen Eugenio A. Benavides, Villa, Obregon,
Rodolfo Fierro, Dr. Lyman B. Raschbaum (German agent), Gen. Jose Ruiz.
Aultman Collection. Courtesy Southwest Reference Dept., El Paso Public Library.

Columbus, N.M. Unloading equipment prior to Punitive Expedition.
Aultman Collection. Courtesy Southwest Reference Dept., El Paso Public Library.
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Battery of Mexican machine guns.
International Film Service.
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Robert Lansing, United States Secretary of State, was convinced
that the German Government was making every effort to stir up
trouble between the United States and Mexico. 77 In his diary, before the de facto recognition of Carranza, he wrote that Germany
wa~ted to maintain. the chaos in Mexico until the United States
was forced to intervene. The Secretary warned that the United
States must not intervene, that she must recognize the dominant
faction in Mexico in order to promote stability, and that GerrnanAmerican relations rated first priority.78 After the Columbus Haid,
President Wilson remarked to his secretary, Joseph Tumulty, that
German agents had been hard at work to provoke a~ American
intervention in Mexico. 79 One of the Mexican-German conspiracies was introduced at the same time as the Huerta-Orozco plot. 80
In April 1915 Villa's agent in the United States, Felix Sommerfeld,
entered into a conspiracy with the German Secret Service, originally on his own initiative. S !
During the next month Bernhard Dernburg, German Agent of
Propaganda in the United States, sent a report to Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff. Holtzendorff promptly referred the report to
Secretary of German Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow,' for comment. 82 Though mostly concerned with the American export. of
arms to the Entente powers, part of the dispatch dealtwith a previqus conversation of Dernburg and Sommerfeld. It read:
All the contracts [with the Entente] of the arms factories have a
clause in which these [contracts] become null and void in the same
momerit that the United States becomes involved in war [Mexican].
The policies of the United States in respect to Mexico are known to
all. And one can be completely convinced that the government of the
United States will do everything possible to avoid an intervention in
Mexico. The military of the United States, however, strongly supports
intervention, as well as the state governments of Texas and Arizona
which lie directly on the Mexican border. Approximately two months
ago, there occurred an incident on the border of Arizona [Naco],
which almost caine to an intervention [by the United States]. As a
consequence, the American Chief of General Staff [Hugh Scott] was
sent to the border by President Wilson on the suggestion 6f the Minister of War, [Lindley] Garrison, to negotiate with Villa. These con-
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ferences resulted through the mediation of Felix A. Sommerfeld, and
at that moment, as he told me many times, it would have been very
easy for him to provoke an intervention. Such an intervention represented for Germany the following: An embargo on all munitions to
the Allies. Since the Allies depended on such munitions, the embargo
would bring as a consequence rapid victory to Germany [in Europe].
A limitation of credits [for the Allies] and a change in policy of the
United States would also profit Germany. On the other hand, Felix
A. Sommerfeld had reservations against forcing intervention at that
time through Villa, since he did not know the intentions of Germany
with respect to the United States nor did he know what Germany
desires in the future with respect to the United States, and therefore,
he did not want to run the risk of working against German policy or
make a hasty step, aggravating instead of bettering the situation. It
appears that this opportunity will come again in the very near future,
and Felix A. Sommerfeld discussed this with me. He is completely
convinced that an intervention in Mexico by the United States can
be brought about. With the exception of Mr. Sommerfeld, the instigator of this idea, I am the only one to know of his plans. We both
agreed not to discuss this subject with the German Ambassador
[Count Johann von Bernstorff] here [Washington, D.C.] because we
are of the conviction that the fewer people that know about it the
better it is, and besides, this delicate opportunity can only be directed
to the appropriate decision-making office. I ask you, that after having
read this report, you give Mr. Sommerfeld, either through me or directly, a yes or no. In concluding, I must mention that we, Felix A.
Sommerfeld and I, both give our word of honor as German citizens,
that whatever your decision, we will communicate this to no one. 83

Bernhard Dernburg's request for a "yes or no" to Sommerfeld's
plan for American intervention in Mexico was. immediately considered by von Jagow:
My answer must be unquestionably 'yes.' Even if the munitions
supply cannot be stopped [to Europe], which doesn't appear to me
very certain, it would be very desirable that America, more friend of
the English, should be occupied in war [in Mexico] and should be
turned away from Europe. It [the U.S.] will not intervene in China
and because of this an action against Mexico, provoked by the situation, would be the only possibility to divert the American government. 84
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Felix Sommerfeld, a native German who had emigrated at the
turn of the century to the State of Chihuahua, was the key figure
in the Mexican-German conspiracy. He became Francisco Madero's chief press agent in the United States. 85 Following Madero's
assassination, Sommerfeld sought asylum in the German Embassy,
and Paul von Hintze, German Ambassador to Mexico, helped him
Bee to the United States. 86 Here, Sommerfeld made contact with
Villa and soon became Villa's chief unofficial diplomatic agent in
the United States. He also became active in buying weapons for
Villa, lining his own pockets at the same time. 87 If Sommerfeld
cannot be directly related to the Columbus Raid, his intrigue on
behalf of Germany and the material benefits of this intrigue made
available to Villa prove that the German government was partially
responsible. Germany directly provided support to the Villista
movement-and helped keep Villa alive.
. Sommerfeld's contacts with the German Secret Service were
indeed close. American agents from the Justice Department established definitely that Sommerfeld was in contact with Franz Rintelen von Kleist and that from April to August 1915, over $340,000
had been deposited in his St. Louis account from a bank in New
York City. It was not known who had deposited the money in New
York. It was established, however, that on the same day, from the
same bank in New York, money had been deposited into a second
account in St. Louis-the same bank which carried Sommerfeld's
account. Both accounts were closed on the same day. The second
account belonged to the German Embassy in the United States.
Justice Department agents concluded that there had to be a connection between the two accounts. They proved that the total
amount of money in Sommerfeld's account had been withdrawn
in favor of the Western Cartridge Company to purchase weapons
for Villa. 88
Whatever Sommerfeld's motives, if he did not work specifically
for an attack on Columbus, New Mexico, he did indeed conspire
for American intervention in Mexico. This could best be accomplished by viol~tion of the international border. 89 The fact that
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Villa acquired increased German help after the Columbus Raid
does support the following thesis:
German foreign policy as carried out by the Admiral Staff and
the Greater General Staff was partially responsible for the Columbus Raid. 90
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p. 25. Tompkins, p. 36, says that he vowed vengeance. Larry A. Harris,

MUNCH: COLUMBUS RAID

205

Pancho Villa and the Columbus Raid (El Paso, 1949), p. 80, and William
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and Collector of Customs, Zachary Cobb.
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29· Kahle, pp. 364-65.
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Mexico, to Secretary of State, 812.00/16892, Nov. 24,1915.
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Dec. 15,1915.
38; NA-RDS, "Report of Conditions Along the Border," 812.00/17078,
Jan. 8, 1916; Langsford, p. 280.
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56. Clendenen, p. 217.
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to Secretary of State, 812.00/16843, Nov. 22,1915.
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17°83, Nov. 24, 1915; Zachary Cobb to Secretary of the Treasury, 812.00/
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9, 19 15.
59. NA-RDS, Zachary Cobb to Secretary of State, 812.00/16851, Nov.
24,19 15.
60. There is evidence (or I should say-there was evidence) that Villa
had planned a foray into the United States in the vicinity of Columbus as
early as Jan. 8, 1916. Two large wallets containing official Villa records
were captured. They were examined by George C. Carothers late on March
9, and he found a letter from Villa to Zapata dated January 8, 1916, inviting Zapata to come north with his army and join in a concerted attack on
the United States. See NA-RDS, George C. Carothers to Secretary of State,
812.00/17401, March 10, 1916. Link (p. 205, n. 47) also cites this letter:
"See F. Villa to E. Zapata, January 8, 1916, from San Geronimo Ranch,
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Mexico. What was apparently another copy, dated January 6, 1916, was
dropped by Villa at Columbus and printed in the New York Times, March
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venganza sobre Columbus, N.M. (~exico, ,1960), pp. 17-28, puts forth this
interpretation of the Columbus Raid. He states that Samuel Ravel refused
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son, Ira J. Ravel, that there had never been any business dealings between
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NA-RDS, Zachary Cobb to Secretary of State, 812.00/17402, ~arch 10,
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intrigue with, Villa before March 9, 1916. He is in error. Villa, through
his agent Felix Sommerfeld, had maintained contacts with German Secret
Service agents since April 1915. Friedrich Katz, Deutschland, takes the
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Villa until Jan. I, 1916. "Sommerfeld telegraphed to General Scott that
rumors of Villa's resignation and Bight from Mexico were 'fakes' and an
interview that Villa was supposed to have given to the correspondent of the
New York American was fraudulent." Hugh Lenox Papers. Cf. "Villa's
'First Aid' to Washington," Literary Digest, vol. 52 (Jan. I, 1916), p. 5, as
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Secret Service was April 1915 to January 1916. It should also be "noted that
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the Santa Ysabel massacre on January 10, 1916, he claimed to have sent to
Villa a protest telegram which called the massacre the greatest crime ever
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Sommerfeld to Scott, Jan. 16, 1916 (COpy) as cited in Katz, Deutschland,
p. 345. Sommerfeld's protest would seem to indicate that he truly had left
the employ of Villa by January 16, 1916. Much later, however, after the
Columbus Raid, Carranza's agents informed the U.S. government that Sommerfeld was still buying weapons for Villa. If this is true, there was no
break between Sommerfeld as agent of Villa and Sommerfeld as contact for
the German Secret Service between April 1915 and April 1917. See AREM
Mexico, Le 803 R, Monteverde to Consul in Los Angeles, March 7, 1917,
as cited in Katz, Deutschland, p. 345.
74. Katz, Deutschland, pp. 337-38; "Alemania y Francisco Villa," Historia Mexicana, vol. 12 (Julio-Septiembre, 1962), p. 88. That this was a
policy of the German government through 1915 can be seen in NA-RDS,
American Consul at Havana, Cuba, William Gonzales to Secretary of State,
812.00/1696 3, Dec. 14, 1915. See also Cline, p. 184.
75. Michael C. Meyer, "The Mexican-German Conspiracy of 1915,"
The Americas, vol. 23 (1966), p. 76.
76. Ibid., p. 82.
77· Kahle, pp. 353-54·
78. Documentos hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana: Revoluci6n y
regimen Constitucionalista III, Carranza, Wilson y el ABC. Editados por
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la Comision de Investigaciones Historicas de la Revolucion Mexicana bajo
la direccion de Isidro Fabela (Mexico, 1962), Doc. 39, p. 4°1. Lansing's
diary also cited in Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New
York, 1963), p. 89; Katz, "AIemania y Francisco Villa," p. 93; Clendenen,
P·29 8.
79. Katz, "Alemania y Francisco Villa," p. 93; Link, p. 21 4.
80. For a thorough treatment of the Huerta-Orozco plot see Meyer,
"The Mexican-German Conspiracy of 1915," pp. 76-89 as well as Meyer,
Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution 1910-1915
(Lincoln, 1967), Ch. 7, pp~ I 15-35. In 'The Mexican-German Conspiracy
of 1915," p. 88, Meyer writes that the German government was far from
shattered by the failure of Huerta and Orozco: "With characteristic efficiencya secondary plan was put into operation almost immediately. Even
during the period of intense negotiations with Huerta and Orozco, German
intelligence agents, fully aware that the scheme might prove abortive, had
initiated similar negotiations with Felix Sommerfeld, orie of Pancho Villa's
representatives in the United States." He notes that this intrigue lasted well
into 1916. There is evidence that German intelligence. agents had not
initiated negotiations with Felix Sommerfeld, but that Sommerfeld took the
initiative. See German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico I SECR., vol. I,
Dernburg to Holtzendorff, May 1915, as cited in Katz, Deutschland, p. 343.
81. Katz, Deutschland, p. 342. After the certain failure of the HuertaOrozco plot, however, there are "indications" that Franz Rintelen von Kleist
had conversations with Sommerfeld in the United States. See Katz, "Alemania y Francisco Villa," p. 96.
82. Katz, Deutschland, p. 342; "AIemania y Francisco Villa," p. 89.
83. German Foreign Office, Bonn,Mexico, I SEeR., vol. I, Dernburg
to Holtzendorff, May 1915, as cited in Katz, Deutschland, pp. 342-43;
"AIemania y Francisco Villa," pp. 89-90' Sommerfeld undoubtedly was referring to the border incident at Naco. Battles between Villistas and Carranzistas in Naco resulted in several dead on the American· side· of the
border. General Hugh Scott was sent to obtain a withdrawal of.both Mexican factions. Scott's negotiations with Villa were very heated. Katz, "Alemania y Francisco Villa," pp. 94-95·, sees a deterioration in the relations between Villa and the U.S.-an outcome of the Naco conferences. Katz
presents the thesis that as relations between Villa and the American government became colder in 1915, German relations with Villa grew correspondingly closer-and that the ebb and flow of diplomatic support given to the
various Mexican leaders always found the American and German governments in opposition. Meyer, "The Mexican-German Conspiracy of 1915,"
pp. 88-89, seems to indicate also that as relations between the U.S. and
Pancho Villa cooled, German interest in Villa increased. Meyer also notes
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the corresponding American switch to Carranza. "President Wilson, long
antagonistic toward Venustiano Carranza, began to temper his censures
of the Mexican regime." However, late March 1916 brought a new relationship between Carranza and Germany after Pershing's entry into Mexico. Of interest is the first sentence of the quotation from Dernburg's
dispatch to Holtzendorff, which is not dissimilar to wording in the later
Zimmermann Telegram. .
84. German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico I SECR., vol. I, Dernburg
to Holtzendorff; May 1915, as cited in Katz, Deutschland, p. 343; Katz,
"Alemania y Francisco Villa," p. 91.
85. NA, StDF 812.00/13232, Letcher to Bryan, August 25, 1914, as
quoted in Katz, Deutschland, p. 34486. German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico I, vol. 33, Hintze to Foreign
Office, Feb. 23, 1913, as cited in Katz, Deutschland, p. 344.
87. NA, StDF 812.00/13232, Letcher to Bryan, August 25, 1914, as
cited in ibid. The question must be raised: What motivated Sommerfeld
to initiate contacts with German Secret Service agents in April 1915, and
to offer them his services? Sommerfeld was known to be unduly concerned
with personal gain. Explanation for his actions possibly can be found in
his contacts with American business interests in Mexico-interests which in
1915-16 were clamoring for American intervention in Mexico. There is
strong circumstantial evidence that Sommerfeld was in the employ of the
German Secret Service, American business corporations, and Francisco Villa
to promote American intervention-but for different reasons. See NA, StDF
812.00/12706, Cobb to Bryan, August I, 1914, as cited in Katz, Deutschland, pp. 344-45.
88. Senate Propaganda, vol. 2, pp. 2168 ff. as cited in ibid., p. 345.
89. This is not to say that Villa was a stooge. Acceptance of such help
in no way meant any obligation or entrance into German services. Villa,
like other revolutionaries, exploited the contradictions of the greater powers
to achieve his own ends. See Katz, Deutschland, pp. 345-46; Clendenen, p.
3 I 7; Federico Cervantes M., Francisco Villa y la Revoluci6n (Mexico,
1960), p. 538.
90. Nevertheless, there were Mexican-American provocations-themselves sufficient to inspire the raid on Columbus. See Viereck, pp. 105f, and
German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico I, vol. 56. Doc. Note of Montgelas,
March 23, 1916, Voska/Irwin, p. 197, German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico as cited in Katz, Deutschland, p. 347. Katz, "Alemania y Francisco
Villa," pp. 96-97, 100-101; Braddy, Pershing's Mission in Mexico, p. 77;
Tuchman, p. 95.

